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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
a.

The error of dismissing Big Ditch Irrigation Company's ("Big Ditch") antitrust

counterclaim against Salt Lake City ("SLC") by applying a municipal status statutory defense,
and by considering the wrong counterclaim (the original counterclaim had already been
amended).

Grant of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for correctness.1

This issue was

preserved below at R. 105-28, 202-16, and 251-65.
b.

The error of dismissing Big Ditch's antitrust counterclaim against SLC without

leave to amend. While discretionary, dismissals with prejudice without leave to amend are
disfavored.2

Relatedly, whether the district court erred in denying Big Ditch's motion to

amend its pleadings to rehabilitate the antitrust counterclaim. The legal standard governing a
district court's discretion is reviewed for correctness.3 This issue was preserved below at R.
105-28 and 1109-69.
c.

The error, on summary judgment, of ruling that an integrated contract

transferred title to SLC despite contrary contractual language and contrary conduct by SLC.
Relatedly, the error of ruling that the same water exchange contract vested Big Ditch with no
entitlement to the use of water sufficient to file water change applications. Relatedly, whether

1

Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996).

2

Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993).

3

Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218,1220 (Utah 1996); Rushton v. Salt Lake County,
1999 UT 36, f 17, 977 P.2d 1201.
1

the district court erred by failing to review the plenary record in its denial of the motion as
required by Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. Proc. The proper legal standards governing a decision
are reviewed for correctness,4 as are decisions construing the meaning of a contract5 and
interpretations of decisions of the Utah Supreme Court6 and statutes.7

This issue was

preserved below at R. 461-76, 4034 and 5393-5912.
d.

The error of denying a motion to reconsider on whether title had been

conveyed to SLC. Abuse of discretion is the standard of review governing the denial of a
motion to reconsider.8 This issue was preserved below at R. 4019-4395.
e.

The error of concluding that exchange contract water users may be implicidy

restricted in their water use by straight-line geographic, not hydrologic, boundaries, to one
particular use (irrigation), in perpetuity. The legal standards by which a district court makes
its decisions are reviewed for correctness.9 This issue was preserved below at R. 5393-5912.
£

The error of accepting two conclusory expert affidavits from SLC, refusing to

admit two rebuttal expert affidavits submitted by Big Ditch, and refusing the affidavit of Big
Ditch's president.

An evidentiary decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, except

A

Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

*Aquagen Int'lv. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998).
6

4447Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 1999 UT App 13, If 9, 973 P.2d 992.

7

Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,% 17, 977 P.2d 1201; Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co.,
910 P.2d 1218,1220 (Utah 1996).

*Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381,1387 (Utah 1996); Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d
1218, 1220 (Utah 1996).
'Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
2

correctness is used when considering the legal basis for such a decision.10 This issue was
preserved below at R. 398-407, 5357-65, 3186-88, 3917-18 and 1031-42.
g.

The error of ignoring factual disputes concerning estoppel and modification in

granting SLC's final motion for summary judgment, including resolving the inherently factual
issue of reasonability. Summary judgment allows no material disputes of fact.11 If a grant of
summary judgment necessarily resolved factual issues, even implicitly, the district court has
conducted a factual review and has made factual findings, which is error.12 This issue was
preserved below at R. 5402, 5421.
h.

The error of denying summary judgment to Big Ditch when no set of facts

showed the required elements of estoppel, modification or a defense to the statute of frauds.
Denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness.13 This issue was preserved below at
R. 5393-5912.
DISPOSITIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-3 and -3.5 are attached in the Addendum, together with
other relevant authority.

^Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 1999 UT App 80, \ 8, 977 P.2d 508; Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130,
1134 (Utah C t A p p . 1990).
n

Mastv. Oversow 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

n

Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, U 14,184 P.3d 578.

"Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, % 6, 177 P.3d 600.
3

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from the denial and grant of multiple motions

for summary judgment in a civil case.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
Substantive Rulings. SLC commenced this case by filing a complaint against Big

Ditch and four Big Ditch shareholders, Garside, Litke, Downs and J L.C.14 R. 1. SLC and
Big Ditch had executed a water exchange contract in 1905. The complaint alleged that Big
Ditch had wrongfully filed change applications on its contract water; that, as the water's
owner, SLC could veto any change application; and that Big Ditch and J L.C. had slandered
SLC's title by filing the change applications.
Big Ditch and the shareholders filed an answer and counterclaim.

R. 69.

The

counterclaim alleged, inter alia, breach of contract and antitrust violations based on SLC's
disproportionate and illegal role as a water market player. SLC filed a motion to dismiss the
antitrust counterclaim. R. 100. The district court granted SLC's motion, but not before the
shareholders had dropped their claims, and Big Ditch had amended its counterclaim as a
matter of right to address SLC's arguments.15 SLC responded to the amended answer and
counterclaims six weeks after they were filed. R. 343.
Big Ditch filed a motion for partial summary judgment that its contract water right
was fixed based on creek flow (the "fixed quantity motion"). R. 220. Big Ditch argued that
14

Downs was subsequently dismissed.

15

The shareholders and Big Ditch took further action to dismiss the shareholders and reinstate
the antitrust counterclaim. Since these efforts concern the shareholders, they are treated in the
shareholders' brief, incorporated here by reference.

4

the diminishment claims were not supported by the contract, but rather it unambiguously
promised a fixed proportionate quantity of water to Big Ditch.
SLC filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on its first two causes of action
(SLC's "title" motion). R. 288. It argued that its delivery obligations were based on irrigable
acreage in the Big Ditch service area, and relied on extrinsic evidence supporting diminution.
It also argued the contract transferred title to SLC of all the contract water, on both sides of
the exchange. Big Ditch countered that the contract was unambiguous and its plain meaning
controlled, and that, if Big Ditch did not retain title, it still had the right to file change
applications on its contract water.
SLC's title claim was a modern reversal of position. Accordingly, Big Ditch filed on
April 7, 2008, another motion for partial summary judgment contrasting SLC's current and
historical positions (Big Ditch's "title motion"). R. 2606.

Big Ditch's title motion thus fit

within the scope of its fixed quantity motions and SLC's title motion, R. 1378-79 fn. 1, and
raised factual issues with SLC's motion.
The district court declined to hear argument on these three related motions together,
even though oral argument on the first two motions was set four months after the third
related motion was filed. This was despite Big Ditch's contention that the evidence in Big
Ditch's title motion created factual issues over SLC's title argument, disputes evidenced by a
plenary record review. R. 4034.
The district court did not mention Big Ditch's title motion in its ruling granting in
part Big Ditch's fixed quantity motion and granting SLC's title motion. R. 3349. The district

5

court ruled that SLC had title to water on both sides of the exchange. Yet it also ruled that
Big Ditch had a right to a fixed quantity of water under the contract, which it deemed
unambiguous and integrated, with no limitation on nature or place of use. The district court
reserved for trial whether there were equitable theories such as estoppel or modification that
might reduce SLC's delivery obligation.
The district court's failure to acknowledge the pendency of Big Ditch's title motion
and its factual issues prompted Big Ditch to file a motion to reconsider the decision granting
title to SLC. R. 4016. While analytically linked, the district court de-linked Big Ditch's title
motion and the motion to reconsider, denied them separately, R. 4833, 5260, and cited the
analytical gaps created by their dissociation to deny them.16
On December 24, 2008, Big Ditch accepted arguendo facts SLC had adduced to
substantiate its equitable theories, and moved for summary judgment, contending that those
facts did not meet SLC's burden. R. 5387.

SLC cross-moved on the same facts, R. 5985,

and in responding to the cross-motion Big Ditch raised factual disputes, R. 5402, 5421, and
challenged the facts' admissibility. R. 5355. The district court granted SLC's motion, R.
6339, reversing its decision of August 22, 2008 by placing nature and use restrictions on Big
Ditch's entitlement to the use of water under the contract. It also ruled that Big Ditch could
not file change applications on its contractual water entitlement.
16

Big Ditch argued either that the exchange contract was an exchange of usufructs or,
alternatively, an exchange of title. The intervening ruling vesting SLC with title prompted Big
Ditch to pursue the exchange of title argument, which it now acknowledges this Court need not
necessarily reach: entitlement, not title, is the issue. The district court rejected this argument.
R. 4833. Big Ditch filed a motion to reconsider the district court's denial of Big Ditch's title
motion on September 22, 2008, R. 4010, which was denied. R. 5260.
6

Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings. SLC supported its tide motion with an affidavit
of Jeffry Niermeyer, SLC's director of public utilities. R. 349. Big Ditch moved to strike this
affidavit as argumentative and legally conclusory, particularly with respect to the contractual
intent of the parties. 408, 477 This motion was denied. R. 2945.
Big Ditch submitted the affidavit of the president of Big Ditch, James Garside R. 481,
(also a party) to counter SLC's title motion for summary judgment. In order to rebut the
argument that SLC would be harmed by honoring the 1905 contract, the affidavit
documented SLC's surplus water supply. The district court struck the affidavit, stating that it
dealt with antitrust issues (despite that the affidavit was offered solely on SLC's claims of
harm). The district court struck only a portion of the Garside affidavit, but did not specify
which portion. R. 2945.
On July 3, 2008, Big Ditch filed the affidavit of its expert, Ronald K. Christensen,
Ph.D., and sought permission to file the affidavit despite the close of briefing on pending
summary judgment motions. R. 3184. Oral argument on two of the motions had been set
three weeks later,

July 22, 2008. R. 3258. The affidavit rebutted the affidavit of Mr.

Niermeyer, discussed the nature of Big Ditch's title to its water, and supported Big Ditch's
fixed quantity and title motions. On September 11, 2008, Big Ditch filed a supplemental
affidavit of Mr. Christensen reflecting his further investigation, with another motion seeking
permission to file. R. 3373. The district court denied Big Ditch permission to file the first
affidavit17 R. 4833.

17

The district court did not address the September 11 affidavit.
7

On December 4, 2008, SLC filed a second affidavit of Mr. Niermeyer, R. 5308. Big
Ditch filed a motion in limine to exclude this affidavit, R. 5355, arguing that it was legally
conclusory.

The district court denied the motion. R. 6324.

Finally, the district court

overruled Big Ditch's objection to the final order, R. 6349, prepared by SLC. R. 6357.
C.

Statement of Facts. In 1905 Big Ditch and SLC entered into a water exchange

contract. R. 19. Big Ditch transferred to SLC the right to divert and use the water it had
been taking from Big Cottonwood Creek. In exchange, SLC would timely deliver a fixed
amount of water to Big Ditch, tied to the measured flow in the creek. The exchange gave
SLC high quality canyon water and gave Big Ditch a flow of water at Big Ditch's diversion
point from sources of SLC's choosing. For the next thirty years SLC executed 31 other
similar exchange contracts with other companies. R. 5310.
In 1914, The Progress Co. v. Salt Yjike City, Civil No. 8921, adjudicated a dispute
between SLC and the Progress Company. The decision fixed the amount of water SLC (on
behalf of Big Ditch) could divert from the creek, and in turn recognized that SLC could take
this water "by virtue o f the 1905 contract. R. 28.
In the intervening decades, SLC either never claimed or eschewed tide to Big Ditch's
contract water. R. 1383-92. During this time Big Ditch's service area gradually urbanized,
and, while SLC continued to deliver Big Ditch's full contractual amount through the
diversion structure, Big Ditch turned less water into its conduit. SLC also acquired water
rights exceeding its contemporary or projected needs and leased these as "surplus." R. 6302.
It also engaged in aggressive practices to control and eventually eliminate its exchange

8

partners, R. 2595, 4274-75, characterizing other water users as "dangerous" and "sinister"
who would need to respond to SLCs "muscle." R. 6289-90.
In 2006 Big Ditch filed a number of administrative change applications to change
points of diversion of its exchange water. SLC protested and then, in 2007, sued Big Ditch
and various Big Ditch shareholders for filing the change applications. SLC claimed that Big
Ditch had no residual entitlement to file such applications.18
SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T
The district court ruled that the 1905 exchange contract and a 1914 court ruling
granted water title to SLC, on both sides of the exchange. This left Big Ditch with no
residual entitlement to the use of water, and barred Big Ditch from filing change
applications. This conclusion presupposed arbitrary contractual restrictions on place and
nature of use. It also ignored SLCs own historical conduct and the express language of the
contract.
The district court erred in finding that equity had reduced Big Ditch's contractual
share, either through estoppel or modification.

Disputed factual issues made summary

judgment improper.
The district court erred by dismissing Big Ditch's antitrust counterclaim by (1) ruling
on the wrong counterclaim; (2) failing to discern in the allegations cognizable antitrust
violations, including SLCs aggressive efforts to drive its exchange partners (such as Big
Ditch) from the water market; and (3) granting SLC antitrust immunity when SLC banks

18

The balance of the facts are in the Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
9

water and sells it as surplus as a market participant.
ARGUMENT
Introduction. Sagebrush and cottonwood trees. This was likely the 1846 landscape
dominating the site of the Matheson Courthouse. Later, it was transformed into farmland,
and then into an urban, perhaps even industrial landscape, until today, where upon it sits a
modern building with indoor plumbing.
It would be trite to say that water made this all possible. And only partially
true. Water development made it possible. Flexible, transferrable, elastic water development.
Water development not bound by arbitrary straight lines or oppressive regulation and
restriction.
SLC and Big Ditch signed an exchange contract in 1905. It was a monument to
flexible water development, allowing each party to use the best water suited to it. But water
needs change with time. Big Ditch has realized that its irrigation needs in Midvale are going
away. Its exchange water

should

be used elsewhere, for

the benefit

of

other

development. Irrigation needs have dried up; time to move on.
SLC defines "moving on" as death. The death of Big Ditch. This is the fate SLC
foresees for all of its exchange partners, while SLC accrues far more water than it could ever
need. SLC's efforts to kill Big Ditch are just a part of its strategy to dominate the valley water
markets with unfair and illegal practices.
Big Ditch has water that it wants to use beneficially, through access to the change
application process.

Such water "rezoning" is crucial to preserving beneficial use. SLC

10

would deny such change, a privilege that even sewer effluent enjoys.
Big Ditch does not wish to go gently into the night SLC has prepared for it. Flexible
water transfer, free from arbitrary restraint, and free from the illegal practices of a city doing
far more than care for its citizens, is what Big Ditch seeks. Flexible transfer gives Big Ditch
life, just as the cliche assigns water the same role to the Earth.
I.

BIG DITCH HAS A STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT TO USE WATER.
At first, the district court correctly ruled that Big Ditch was entitled to a fixed

delivery of water, and that its water use was not limited to irrigation or to its service area. It
then reversed itself sub silentio. The district court also ruled that SLC had title to the contract
water under Progress Company v. Salt hake Cit/9 and the 1905 contract, and thus Big Ditch
could not file change applications on the contract water. The district court erred. As a
beneficial user of the contract water, Big Ditch has the right to use it, irrespective of who
owns technical title to the water.
A.

Big Ditch Has A Valuable Entitlement.

Claiming "title" is a way to attack another's entitlement to the use of water.20
However, entitlement, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3, and not title, is what matters.
Entitlement gives Big Ditch the right to file change applications. This Court need not reach
whether Big Ditch (or SLC) received title to the contract water. "[Ojwnership of water is far
19

Civil No.8921 (D. Utah 1914). R. 24.

20

In East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993) , the irrigation company
claimed title over the shareholder Payson City, and in Strawberry High Une Canal Co. v. Bureau of
Reclamation, 2006 UT 19,133 P.3d 410, the Bureau of Reclamation claimed title to Strawberry
water in derogation of the users' rights.
11

more complex than ownership of other forms of property, and the mere existence of legal
tide does not determine all the rights of ownership. Indeed, even the term 'ownership' is an
oversimplification."21
This Court has already found that the 1905 exchange contract vested Big Ditch with a
significant entitlement. In Ellerbeck v. Salt Lake City,22 SLC was challenged for issuing a bond
underwriting that contract. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a bond issued for
an exchange, rather than a purchase. This Court raised sua sponte whether SLC was alienating
water contrary to Section 6, Article 11 of the Utah Constitution.23

The parties' focus on

what SLC was receiving triggered scrutiny of what SLC was giving away.
SLC now contends that it conveyed no section 73-3-3 entitlement to Big Ditch in the
1905 contract. Ellerbeck contradicts this contention. SLC did convey substantial value in the
contract, otherwise Ellerbeck would not have engaged in its express constitutional analysis.24
21

East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 317 (Durham, J., dissenting). Big Ditch does not concede that SLC
has title, since vesting title in SLC was unnecessary to adjudicate the rights of the parties. SLC
did not plead quiet title in its complaint. Rather, it assumed it had title, and then sought to
prevent Big Ditch from filing change applications. Complaint \ 36 (R. 10-11). The dismissal of
the slander claim mooted the title issue. SLC argued, R. 1228, that this Court vested title in SLC
in Progress Company v. Salt Lake City, 173 P. 705 (1918), cited in Salt Lake City v. SilverFork Pipeline
Co., 2000 UT 3, 5 P.3d 1206. Progress did not do so, as discussed below, and Silver Fork's
discussion of "title" was mere background to a dispute that had nothing to do with title.
22

29 Utah 361, 81 P. 273 (1905).

23

Neither party raised the issue. The briefs are attached in the Appellants' Addendum.

24

Ellerbeck went on to rule that since SLC received something of substantial value in exchange
for the substantial value it conveyed away, the exchange was constitutional. 81 P. at 274.
Perhaps Ellerbeck regarded the transfer from SLC as a transfer of actual title to the exchange
water. The 1905 contract would then have effected a title-for-title exchange. While this may
be a plausible reading of Ellerbeck, and one that Big Ditch would accept, it is not necessary for
the Court to reach this issue.
12

This result is virtually identical with that of

a later decision construing the Utah

Constitution, Genola v. Santaquin^ where the Court held that a "perpetual and continuous"
contract diversion right like that of Big Ditch amounts to, in all practicality, a water right.
While Genola did not deal with "entitled to use" language, it is clear that the Genola Town's
contractual right was deemed very valuable, even though it did not amount to title.
The entitlement Big Ditch received, acknowledged by Ellerbeck, makes Big Ditch a
beneficial user of the contract water, entitled to use it how it pleases once delivered. The
State Engineer's practice avoids the "ownership" question altogether and focuses instead on
the legislative language of "entitled to the use o f . These statutory interpretations should be
given deference by this Court.26 Entitlement, not ownership is dispositive, as a matter of
legislative intent.
B.

The Contract Conveyed an Entitlement.

The language of the fully integrated and unambiguous 1905 contract reflects a quid
pro quo exchange of value.27 The contract provides:
1. Big Ditch transfers its right to the use of its water to SLC (R. 19; ^fl);
25

80 P.2d 930, 934-35(1938)

26

LPI v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, If 9, 215 P.3d 135. The State Engineer assigns water right numbers
to contractual rights. R. 41,62 (Big Ditch change applications). The State Engineer is complying
with the statutory "entitled to use" language and its statutory duty to administer water by
recognizing the value of such entitlements. Entitlement, not title, arises throughout the code.
For example, a right to the use of sewer effluent under contract (not title to the effluent) is the
predicate to file effluent change applications, Utah Code Ann. § 73-3c-302, a practice SLC
employs. R. 3471. See LPI, 2009 UT 41 at Tf 11 (statute to be construed in harmony with it
constituent parts, including other chapters).
27

The district court was correct in ruling that the 1905 contract was a fully integrated and
unambiguous document. R. 3353.
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2. SLC agrees to "perpetually and continuously deliver" a continuous flow of water
to Big Ditch, defined as a portion of the Big Cottonwood Creek flow. The water
is to be suitable for the purposes of irrigation (R. 19; ^J2);
3. SLC agrees to "maintain all of the existing rights of [Big Ditch] to the waters and
to the channel of said Big Cottonwood Creek, and to bring and defend, at the
expense of [SLC] any and all suits for the purpose of maintaining said rights." (R.
21; 118);
4. SLC agrees that if it fails to deliver for 24 hours the "full quantity" of water it has
promised, then Big Ditch may "retake" its right to creek water. If SLC fails to
deliver the "full quantity" of water under the contract for a period of six months,
the contract shall "terminate," and the parties rights shall revert to pre-contract
status. (R. 21; f9)
5. SLC agrees to keep the diversion structure in good order in case of reverter. (R.
21; 17).
"Exchange" is key. Through it, Big Ditch, like a traditional water right owner, is
entided to a fixed amount of water, for no fee, from a specific diversion point, for its use.
SLC delivers sufficient water for Big Ditch to take its fixed amount. Yet SLC claims tide to
all of the contract water, a notion alien to "exchange."

SLC's ultimate contention has

insistendy been that it requires tide to the canyon water to divert it, and tide to the exchange
water to control how it is delivered. SLC misses the mark. It may control how to convey
and deliver the exchange water to Big Ditch, but cannot retain control over the water once it
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reaches Big Ditch's diversion structure.28 Just as an appropriation fixes a diversion right for a
tide owner, the contract allows SLC to take its water, and Big Ditch to take its water
downstream.

This relationship does not allow reaching along the stream anywhere to

control Big Ditch.29
SLC apparently figured that its claim to the legal artifice of "tide" would annihilate all
of Big Ditch's control over its exchange water. This approach failed to consider that even a
nonowner can be entitled to the use of water, and defeats the "exchange" intent behind the
contract.
SLC's argument misconstrues title. It focuses on molecules of water rather than the
specific right to divert water.

An entitlement to water is not about molecules of water.

Rather, it is about control, defined by where, when, how and against whom the water is used.
Big Ditch has, under the contract, the right to divert water through its diversion structure in
a specific proportionate amount, at specific times, in a certain priority. Thus, Big Ditch's
exchange right is really no different than an appropriator's right to a specific amount of
water from a point of diversion, except SLC has the right to pour different sources of water
into the creek to compensate for the water it takes from the creek upstream. This water may
28

Big Ditch takes its water passively from the creek via a control valve, which allows the desired
amount of water from the creek into the Big Ditch system. R. 753. Because SLC has always had
Big Ditch's full share available, R. 5499-5813, and has maintained water in reserve to perform
the exchange agreements, R. 6064, its claim that "deliveries" have diminished, R. 6125, is untrue:
it has always delivered the full amount. Big Ditch's calls have diminished, not SLC's deliveries.
29

SLC itself has in the past recognized that title is not dispositive of one's right to control water:
R. 5855, 5891, 5894. As discussed in detail below, this Court has addressed control issues
without the need to focus on title. See, e.g., Moyle v. Salt hake City, 50 Utah 357,167 P. 660, 66263 (Utah 1917)(exchange partner with SLC not limited to historical place of use in using
exchange water; court did not address who had title).
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come from Utah Lake, City wells, or even the creek water itself. No matter where the water
comes from, however, Big Ditch's diversion right remains inviolate. Since molecules (creek
molecules, Utah Lake molecules, well molecules) are the only factor distinguishing Big
Ditch's exchange right from a pure appropriated right, Big Ditch's right to divert and place
to beneficial use is intact. This is entitlement in its purest sense.
C.

Diminished Calls Did Not Change the Contract.

To rebut Big Ditch's claims of entitlement, SLC claimed that Big Ditch's reduction in
irrigation calls reflected a contractual intent of diminished delivery. Apart from having no
basis in fact,30 SLC's interpretation of the parties' intent was initially rejected by the district
court. It ruled that the contract was fully integrated and required delivery of a proportionate
fixed amount of water. The contractual term "irrigation purposes" did not tie delivery to
irrigable lands in the Big Ditch service area. "Irrigation purposes" was not a delimiter of
covenants; rather, it described the parties' status. The district court further concluded that
the agreement contained no nature or place of use limitations.31
Reading an implied diminishment clause into the contract would violate strong Utah
policy favoring flexible water development. Exchange contracts must be construed to foster

30

SLC has admitted, as shown in neutral uncontradicted commissioners' reports and through
testimony of its own officials, that Big Ditch's "full share" has always been "available." R. 541718,5499-5813,6064.

31

The district court ruled that SLC's interpretation would render paragraph 2 of the contract
meaningless. R. 5159.
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such development 32 Restrictions on transferability, when imposed, are narrowly defined.33
This Court's 100-year-old practice favoring flexible water development reflects that any
restriction on the use of water, not needed to prevent direct prejudice to the restrictor, is
suspect.34 Such suspicion is warranted here where one of the contracting parties did not
bargain for a restriction,35 but instead now collaterally invokes it to make a claim to allot the
water subject to the contract, on both sides of the exchange.36 Apart from defeating beneficial
use, SLC's interpretation skews the water market in SLC's favor by impeding transferability.
Contracts allowing implementation of disfavored policies should be strictly interpreted so as
to diminish their effect.37
In short, neither an exchange of title nor control is required to effect the agreement.
SLC cites its initial control of molecules of water to control them forever.

This is not

32

Mojle v. Salt"LakeCity, 167 P. at 662 (contract to be interpreted so as to avoid waste and
encourage beneficial use).

33

EastJordan, 860 P.2d at 315-16 (shareholders retain substantial protections even when deprived
of right to file change applications); accord Strawberry, 2006 UT 19 at f 37 {East Jordan is a shield
for shareholders, not a sword against them).

34

East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 315-16; Sjrett v. Tropic &E. Fork Irr. Co., 89 P.2d 474 (Utah 1939);
Bairdv. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060 (1927).
35

See, e.g., Moyle, 167 P. at 662-63 (exchange contract silent as to place of use; court refuses to
infer historic place of use as contractually required, citing in support need for flexible water
development policy).
36

A change application on a share can be defeated only if the company can show prejudice
resulting from the change. See Utah Code Ann. 73-3-3; see also East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 312-14.
37

Utah property law favors the free alienability of property. Redd v. Western Sav. <&Loan Co., 646
P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1982). Contracts restraining the alienation of property are generally invalid
unless meeting strict exceptions of reasonability. Redd, 646 P.2d at 766-67; see also Anderson v.
Provo City, 2005 UT 5, f26,108 P.3d 701.
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necessary to effect the exchange contract, does not reflect the parties' contractual intent, and
violates the express language of the contract and Utah public policy.
D.
SLC Is Precluded by its Conduct from Denying That Big Ditch's
Exchange Rights Are an Entitlement.
The value of Big Ditch's entitlement is reflected in SLC's historically quiescent
attitude toward it. The record from Progress v. Salt hake Citf* and other historical documents
show that SLC never claimed, and actually eschewed, control over Big Ditch's exchange
water until about 1993.
The exchange contract arose out of SLC's need to secure water without funds.
Exchange was the only way it could secure a reliable domestic supply. When SLC's exchange
right was challenged by the Progress Company, SLC allied with its exchange partners to
defend that right. SLC's legal positions in Progress now preclude it from taking a contrary
position. SLC is similarly precluded, under theories of equitable and judicial estoppel, from
departing from its historically consistent position that Big Ditch has an entitlement to use
water. A fortiori, all of these theories bar SLC from claiming title to and/or control of all of
the water subject to exchange.
In 1904 SLC secured bond funds to pay for infrastructure and the capital to secure
the right to use water from the mountains. SLC approved a resolution stating that SLC was
not able to purchase Big Ditch's rights outright.39 SLC communicated to the public in open
meetings and through this resolution that it was not seeking to acquire Big Ditch's water. R.
38

References to Progress in this section are to the district court proceedings.

39

R. 1379-80; 1457-65 (City in no position to purchase the farmers' water; an absolute exchange
might be preferable, but this conditional one will do).
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1379-81. SLC's litigation posture in Progress and Big Ditch's alliance with SLC therein also
show how SLC consistently acknowledged the value of Big Ditch's water holdings. R. 138389. SLC continued this approach in its appeal, and in subsequent litigation. R. 1389-92.
Both the record and decree in Progress show that the Progress court did not interpret or
construe the 1905 agreement. The court merely accepted it as a document that controlled
the legal posture of the parties. Progress did not alter the contract's language. Indeed, Progress
referred back to the contract, stating that SLC had "by virtue o f the contract acquired the
right to use Big Ditch's water.40
The decree must be consistent with the record that generated it. Accordingly, the
Progress court accepted SLC's and Big Ditch's mutually agreed position in the pleadings and
briefing that the exchange contract gave standing to SLC to contest the Progress Company's
claims. SLC represented that the agreement gave SLC the right to use canyon water, but
never claimed control over Big Ditch's contract exchange right. Given this position, Big
Ditch argued below that SLC was equitably barred under the doctrines of issue preclusion,
claim preclusion, judicial estoppel and equitable estoppel from making a claim of title to all
of the water on both sides of the exchange, and, a fortiori, from claiming that Big Ditch's
exchange water was not an entitlement. Since title to the exchange water was not at issue in
Progress, the court's ultimate mandate could not encompass any grant of title.41
40

R. 28. Progress adjudicated allocations among the various parties, ratios that had up to that
point been undefined. Since SLC's rights against the Progress Company were derivative of Big
Ditch's, Big Ditch's rights logically needed to be defined by the court.
41

SLC argued below that Progress dispositively quieted title in SLC. This ignored the record and
SLC's arguments in Progress. Nothing in Progress suggests that it intended to contravene or
interpret the contract. The contract remains dispositive as to the exchange partners' rights, not
19

SLC has gone on record, in Progress and elsewhere, that it did not claim tide to the
canyon water. These arguments were briefed voluminously below in Big Ditch's title motion
for summary judgment, and need not be repeated here. R. 1398-1416.42 What does require
scrutiny, however, is the district court's remarkable response.

Rather than treat the

arguments on their merits, it flady stated that its intervening tide decision had mooted them.
R. 4834. A short while later, when considering Big Ditch's motion to reconsider the tide
issue, the district court revisited the estoppel issue by concluding that by arguing estoppel
Big Ditch was impermissibly attempting to adduce parol evidence, and was being
inconsistent with its prior litigation posture. R. 5260. The district court erred in two critical
respects.
First, the preclusion and estoppel arguments do not construe the contract. Rather,
they focus on SLC's conduct, which bars it from offering interpretations inconsistent with
that conduct.43 Second, while the contract is integrated, negotiations before it was adopted
are admissible to show its meaning, as is evidence that clarifies, but does not contradict or

Progress. Moreover, even if Progress did construe the relationship between SLC and Big Ditch,
it did not materially change E//erbeckys conclusion that Big Ditch received an entidement under
the exchange. Were it somehow determined that the parties' representations in Progress (and the
other representations SLC has made) meant that the parties exchanged tide, they still made an
exchange. An exchange is what SLC claimed in Progress and what Big Ditch relied on in
participating as it did with SLC in that case.
42

These arguments focused on exchange of usufruct versus exchange of title. The point was to
show that SLC did not contractually gain absolute control of Big Ditch's entidement.

43

SLC seemed to have no difficulty branding Big Ditch's efforts to raise estoppel as violating
the parol evidence rule while denying it was doing so through its own estoppel theories
(discussed below).
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vary from, the language of the contract 44
Here, the contract was unambiguous and integrated. The evidence concerning SLC's
conduct both before and after the contract was executed is consistent with the agreement's
express meaning, particularly the intent of the parties to effect an exchange.

As for

"inconsistencies," these were borne of the procedural accident that the district court did not
consider Big Ditch's estoppel motion until after it had ruled on SLC's motion claiming title.45
Big Ditch consistently argued that SLC was barred from claiming that Big Ditch did not have
an entitlement, a position reflected by the contract's express language and SLC's historical
litigation posture and conduct.
Most important, SLC did not need control over the water in Big Ditch's ditch to effect
the parties' contractual intent SLC did not, and cannot, show that its contractual benefits
are impaired by Big Ditch retaining control of the water it receives.46 Big Ditch retains its
contractual privilege to take its contract water at its diversion point, and then use it as it
pleases.47
44

Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 214; Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 212. See, e.g., Cantamar,
L.L.C.. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, f ) , 142 P.3d 140.
45

This was despite Big Ditch's repeated requests that the court address all of the motions
together and not seriatim. See, e.g., R. 1378-79 fn. 1.
46

Losing a windfall arising from nondelivery is not impairment of a contractual right. SLC's
failure to show any harm is treated in detail below (discussion of impairment required for any
finding of estoppel).

47

Irrespective of how title vests, Big Ditch received entitlement from the exchange. It is
possible that SLC could have title to all of the exchange water while Big Ditch retains a residual
entitlement to file change applications as an equitable owner of the exchange water. See
Strawberry^ 2006 UT 19 (discussed below). Most logically, if SLC received title to the canyon
water, Big Ditch should receive title to the contract water. When confronted with this argument
21

E.
Big Ditch's Contract Diversion Right is the Type of Entitlement
Granting The Right To File Change Applications.
SLC argued below that any entitlement Big Ditch may have does not allow it to file
change applications. Originally the district court rejected amount and place or nature of use
restrictions on Big Ditch's entitlement, and then reversed itself. R. 6339. It ruled that such
restrictions were implicit in the contract, and thus ultimately concluded that Big Ditch lacked
sufficient control over its exchange right to qualify as one who is entitled to the use of water
under section 73-3-3.
The district court ruled:
1.

Big Ditch's exchange right did not amount to title.

2.

Only an "'appropriator' or owner" of the water right could rightfully invoke
entitlement status under section 73-3-3.

3.

This Court has ruled that only an appropriator can file a change application.

Accepting arguendo the first premise, the last two premises are erroneous. The district
court collapsed entitlement with outright ownership

It equated "appropriator" with

"owner," and thus concluded that only an owner can file change applications. This vitiates
section 73-3-3's entitlement language.

below, the district court ruled that the 1905 contract, although an exchange, did not "elevate"
Big Ditch's right to an outright conveyance of water. R. 4835 The reason why, it appeared, was
SLC's ability to designate what water SLC delivers. This source-based analysis is erroneous. It
ignores the fundamental attributes of ownership still imbued within Big Ditch's exchange right
(discussed above). The district court ignored one of its precedents (Big Ditch's right was fixed)
while embracing another (SLC had title). The "fixed amount" ruling was dispositive. No matter
where the molecules of water came from, SLC had the obligation to deliver them in a fixed
proportion, for subsequent use as Big Ditch pleased.
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Section 73-3-3 uses its language purposively. When construing a statute, courts are to
assign words their plain meaning.48 This Court's history of construing this language reflects
that tide or appropriative status are not dispositive.
The district court miscited East Jordan as requiring appropriator status to file change
applications. East Jordan did not require one entided to the use of water to be either an
owner or an appropriator. Rather, it avoided the question of a shareholder's appropriator
status by ruling that even if the shareholder once had ownership status, it had conveyed it
away by becoming part of the collective.49

East Jordan was more concerned with the

contractual controls created by collectivization than title or appropriator status. As such, its
holding was limited to the unique situation governing collectivization.50
This Court has recognized for decades the rights equitable users of water retain,
including the right to file change applications as one "entitled to the use of" water.51 Prisbrey
v. Bloomington Water Co.,52 cited by the district court, is a continuation of that line. Prisbrey
dealt not with the rights of one versus the whole, but rather with the temporal distinction
4S

LPI v. McGee, 2009 UT 41 ^ 11.

49

East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 312-13. Even so, shareholders still retain the right to petition
companies to file change applications, a right companies can refuse only on specific and difficult
to meet standards. East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 315-16; Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5.

50

East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 312-13. East Jordan's focus on collectivization resulted in what some
perceived to be nonsensical results. The East Jordan dissent noted that demurring to
collectivization made an arbitrary distinction as to what shareholders can do with their water
once it is delivered to them, especially when it allowed any use below the diversion point but
restricted use above that point. East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 319-20 (Durham, J., dissenting).
"Syrette Tropic <&E. Fork Irr. Co., 89 P.2d 474,475 (Utah 1939); Bairdv. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 257
P. 1060,1066 (Utah 1927); Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 167 P. 660, 662 (Utah 1917).
52

2003 UT 56, 8 2 P . 3 d l l l 9 .
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between a lessee of water and its owner. A lessee has a right that in time will terminate. An
owner, the lessor, does not. Recognizing this temporal horizon, this Court ruled in Prisbrey
that a lessee may not file change applications, since allowing him to do so would derogate the
rights of the owner.53
Prisbrey concluded that one who has a temporary right cannot apply for a permanent
change. It echoes the reasoning in East Jordan that a subordinate water user (e.g., a
shareholder) can push to the boundaries of its use as long as superior water users are not
harmed.54 Nowhere does it state that ownership or appropriator status is required to be a
user of water under section 73-3-3.
The district court read Prisbrey to hold that only an original appropriator of a water
right may file a change application. Strawberry High Une Canal Co. v. Bureau of Reclamation^
confirmed that Prisbrey cannot be read so narrowly, and rather views users such as Big Ditch
as equitable owners of water whose entidement was sufficient to file a change application.56
Strawberry thus repudiates the district court's reading of Prisbrey.
Strawberry reflects that neither Prisbrey nor East Jordan require ownership or
appropriator status to have an entidement to use water. In Strawberry, the United States
53

Id \ 24.

54

See East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 315-16 (shareholders wrongfully barred from filing change
applications may sue).
55

2006 UT 19,133P.3d410.

56

Strawberry noted that Prisbrey should not be read outside of its context as a lessor/lessee case,
and then clarified that 'Prisbrey should not be read as undermining the importance of use as a
basis for filing a change application under Utah's statutory scheme." Strawberry, 2006 UT 19 at
ffif 39-40 (emphasis supplied).
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initially appropriated water, then accepted applications from homesteaders to use the water.
The approved applications meant the homesteaders were "entitled" to a certain quantity of
water "in perpetuity."57 Later the association filed change applications, and the United States
protested, claiming ownership. The association countered, claiming equitable title. The
United States responded that the association had no right to file change applications on a
mere contract right, a contract right that to date it had not fully beneficially used.
This Court disagreed with the United States, stating that the parties had jointly
secured a certificate of appropriation. The court compared the United States to an irrigation
company that holds water rights in trust for those who beneficially use them. It also
specifically rejected any attempt to use Utah water jurisprudence, specifically East Jordan, as a
sword against water users rather than as a shield to protect them.58 The Court then chided
the United States for attempting to use Prisbrey to defeat the association's claims.59
The Court went on to rule that the government could not act in derogation of the
rights of the water users association, which in turn had specific fiduciary and contractual
obligations to its shareholders.60 The obligations of an exchange partner, like SLC here, are
no less onerous. Indeed, they are augmented by the partner's obligation to approach the
contract in good faith and with fair dealing.
Considering the full spectrum of East Jordan, Prisbrey, and Strawberry, being a water
57

Id ^16.

58

Id U 37.

59

Id fl|[ 39-40.

60

Id 1(43.
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user, even without being a water owner, still matters. There are times when that use is
subsumed to other competing interests (East Jordan: collectivization, Prisbrej. lease
termination), but, overall, one with an entidement to use may file change applications, even
though ownership may be clouded or uncertain.61
Big Ditch has the right to file change applications, even if it is not deemed an
"appropriator."62 As noted, appropriator status is not what matters; right to use matters.
Not only is Big Ditch virtually identical with the association in Strawberry; SLC is directly
analogous to the United States. SLC, like the United States, claims to be the nominal owner
of the water, and thus claims the exclusive right to control change applications. In doing so
SLC ignores Big Ditch's right in perpetuity to water delivery, in a fixed amount tied to creek
flows, and for any beneficial use.
Strawberry shows that use matters, not arcane determinations of appropriator status.
61

EastJordan was partially legislatively overruled by Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5, which codified
and clarified shareholders' rights vis-a-vis companies. East Jordan's predecessors and progeny
reflect the reality that East Jordan is a collectivization cul-de-sac on the spectrum of defining
entitlement to the use of water. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 749-50 (Utah
1996); Consolidated Peoples Ditch Co. v. Foothill Ditch Co., 205 Cal. 54, 269 P. 915, 920-21 (1928)
{quoted in EastJordan, 860 P.2d at 315 (allowing individual change applications from shareholders
would "result in a state of inextricable discord and confusion among the owners of water rights
of various sorts . . . .")).
62

Alternatively, Big Ditch might still retain appropriator status. SLC did not acquire Big Ditch's
priority status of appropriator through the contract, inasmuch as the contract did not represent
a reappropriation of the canyon water. SLC understood this in Progress. Had SLC been able to
stand on its own status as appropriator, there would have been no need to stand in Big Ditch's
shoes in Progress to assert priority, nor to require Big Ditch to appear in the case and defend, with
SLC, that priority. Moreover, the existence of the reversion right demonstrates that Big Ditch's
appropriator status has been left intact, irrespective of the realignment of its diversion rights via
the 1905 contract. Just like the association members in Strawberry, Big Ditch's role as a
"participant!] in the appropriation process" confers upon it the right to file change applications,
irrespective of Big Ditch's subordinate contractual status to SLC. Strawberry, 2006 UT19 at ^f 40.
26

Ironically, SLC has already acknowledged this in prior litigation, most notably in the 1993
water rights hearing where it unequivocally claimed that title was immaterial to its right to file
change applications under the statute. R. 5856, 5891, 5894. Appropriator status is an (not the)
indicium of entitlement. As a contract water user, Big Ditch has all the indicia of ownership
of water as would an original appropriator, except the right to dictate which molecules of
water flow into its diversion structure. This distinguisher is insufficient to strip Big Ditch of
its right to file change applications.
The ultimate issue, never addressed by the district court, is whether SLC has veto
power over Big Ditch's change application rights. The contract is integrated and
unambiguous: once SLC delivers water to Big Ditch, Big Ditch is free to use it as it sees fit.
This does not frustrate the contract's purpose.

Analogously, even a post-East Jordan

shareholder has such a right,63 since an irrigation company has no absolute veto power over a
shareholder's petition to file a change application.

SLC, like an irrigation company, can

obstruct its contractual partner's right only by showing harm to its contractual rights, which
it has not done, and cannot do.64
Indeed, unlike a company and its shareholders, which are competing for one pot of
water, here there are two pots of water, SLC's, and Big Ditch's. Absent collectivi2ation and
scarcity, SLC has no basis to claim control of Big Ditch's exchange water, and certainly can

^Bairdv. Upper Canal Irrigation Co., 257 P. 1060,1065 (Utah 1927), cited in East Jordan, 860 P.2d
at 319 (Durham, J., dissenting).
64

SLC never adduced any evidence of how Big Ditch filing change applications would impede
its contractual duties or impede its rights to take water from the canyon. This lack of harm is
further discussed in the estoppel discussion below.
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show no harm or frustration of contractual intent from what Big Ditch does with its water
once it is diverted.
The contract mandates that the parties are now and in perpetuity entitled to their full
call of water.65

Big Ditch's entitlement to file change applications is both contractually

required and good public policy. Allowing Big Ditch to file change applications allows it to
respond to urbanization and continue to use its water beneficially. Clearly, it can do so,
given that SLC has always been prepared to deliver, and has delivered, its full contractual
obligation to Big Ditch, regardless of Big Ditch's historical call.66
Ultimately, this case concerns boundaries on the free transferability of water for
beneficial use. This Court prefers liberal transferability.

It prevents urbanizing irrigation

companies from dying, and it allows water to be beneficially used. Title is not dispositive.
Use is.
II.

N E I T H E R ESTOPPEL N O R MODIFICATION HAVE REDUCED T H E
CITY'S CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.

I Salt Lake City has relied on this [conversion from agricultural uses to residential and
commercial development of] east bench lands as it developed the systems needed to meet
the growing demand for culinary quality water. . . . [EJssentially all of SLC's water resource
J planning, including the maintenance of the pump stations and canals utilized to deliver the
I exchange water, has been based on the reduction in the amount of water necessary to meet
65

This right is virtually identical to that of Genola Town in Genola v. Santaquin, 80 P.2d 930,93435 (Utah 1938).

66

Big Ditch adduced evidence below that SLC has not traditionally used all of its contract water,
and has substantially more water than it requires. The scope and breadth of SLC's overallocation
of water was specifically alleged in Big Ditch's first and second amended counterclaims, R. 251,
1109, is documented in its expert affidavits, R. 3193, 3376, and is discussed in the antitrust
section below.
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I the combined irrigation needs under the 32 exchange agreements. Restoring the original
capacity of the pump plants and canals would be extremely expensive and would, in my
" opinion, be a waste of public money since the original amount of water required by the
combined exchange agreements could not be beneficially used on the lands served by those
systems
J
—Affidavit of Jeffry Niermeyer, One-year Director of Public Utilities, Salt Lake City,
December 3, 2008 R 5311-12

I

SLC has consciously maintained the physical capacity to deliver to individual exchange
partners the full amount of water mentioned in the Exchange Agreements in order to avoid
the possible claim of default until SLCs current obligation is adjudicated.
—Affidavit of Leroy Hooton, 27-year Former Director of Public Utilities, Salt Lake
City, January 23, 2009 R 6064
Under SLCs exchange agreements, we are required to deliver as much water today as 80
years ago
-Memorandum of Leroy Hooton to Mayor Deedee Corradini, February 16, 1996 R
5840
SLCs obligation to deliver exchange water has not lessened since that first exchange
agreement in 1888 . . .
—Leroy Hooton, An AWWA landmark: The Jordan and Salt"LakeCanal, September 17,
1993 R 5911

After the district court initially rejected SLCs incredible shrinking contract
interpretation,67 SLC argued that its delivery obligations had been largely eliminated, either
through modification to the contract or through equitable estoppel.
statements above show, SLC struggled to articulate this change
show reasonable detrimental reliance on Big Ditch's conduct

As the contrasting

Estoppel required SLC to
Modification required

evidence that could defeat an integrated writing.
6

1st Niermeyer Aff., Ex. E, ^ 9, 11, 14. The district court ruled that the contract was
integrated, and nothing in the contract language suggested diminution, restriction to type of use,
or restriction to place of use R. 349-79
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Big Ditch requested evidence of SLC's claimed reliance and documentation of
modification. There was none. Once this scarcity surfaced, Big Ditch moved for summary
judgment, accepting arguendo SLC's inadequate discovery responses and asserting SLC could
not prove estoppel or modification. SLC cross-moved.
The parties' burdens were dissimilar. Big Ditch assumed SLC's stated facts arguendo
only for purposes of its motion (and only conditionally if they were deemed admissible).
The facts, Big Ditch argued, could not support SLC's claims of estoppel or modification.
Big Ditch also showed that those facts, if used offensively by SLC, were either inadmissible
or disputed. SLC's main witness, Mr. Niermeyer, was a City employee. His evidence changed
as SLC's theories changed. These flip-flops, together with Mr. Niermeyer's inherent bias,
prompted Big Ditch to move to strike his statements as incredible, self-serving, internally
inconsistent, and legally conclusory. R. 408, 477. The district court denied the motion, and
consequently relied on Mr. Niermeyer's statements to make its ultimate conclusions that SLC
had demonstrated detrimental reliance.
The district court implicitly resolved the factual disputes regarding Mr. Niermeyer's
inconsistencies and credibility. It also resolved the far more serious dispute between Mr.
Niermeyer's statement that SLC had changed its delivery capacity by relying on diminished
calls, and the directly contrasting statement made by Mr. Niermeyer's predecessor, Mr. Leroy
Hooton, highlighted above.
Apart from its self-serving factual foundation, SLC's estoppel and modification
claims were SLC's already-rejected contractual intent arguments, dressed in equitable clothes.
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SLC's "evidence" was based on contractual language that SLC claimed limited the place and
use of exchange water, and was further based on a very narrow reading of contractual
language that the district court had already rejected.
On the issue of equitable estoppel, the district court ruled that Big Ditch made
decades of diminishing calls, and that even though SLC may have "reached certain legal
conclusions concerning its obligations to Big Ditch under the 1905 Agreement," these played
a "minor role in terms of reliance." R. 6341. The district court ruled further that "virtually
all" of SLC's planning activity was predicated on Big Ditch's diminished calls. R. 6342.
This result errs on a number of fronts:
1. It impermissibly confused the standards of estoppel with those of waiver.
2. It concluded that Big Ditch's use could only be for irrigation in the Big Ditch service
area, a conclusion related to the district court's contemporaneous conclusion that Big
Ditch lacked sufficient entidement to use its contractual water elsewhere, for other
purposes.
3. It resolved factual disputes surrounding SLC's use, and ignored the fact that SLC had
always been able to deliver Big Ditch's water continuously since the execution of the
contract.
4. It assumed that SLC's devising of legal contingency plans was reliant conduct.
Reasonable reliance requires a good faith belief in facts that define one's duty. One
with such a belief does not devise legal contingencies based on alternate facts.

31

5. It ignored evidence demonstrating that reasonable detrimental reliance was legally
impossible, and that SLC could point to no specific reliant conduct.
A.

The District Court Applied the Wrong Standard of Proof and Confused
Estoppel with Waiver.

The elements of estoppel are "first, 'a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted'; next, 'reasonable action or inaction by the
other party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or
failure to act'; and, third, 'injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act.'"68 Estoppel
is a disfavored remedy.69 "Equitable estoppel is intended to prevent a party from taking
unconscionable advantage of its own wrong by asserting its strict legal rights."70 The
wrongdoing of the estopped party is highly relevant. Failure to collect what one is owed the
"wrongdoing" of the collector.71
While Utah courts have never directly addressed the standard of proof for estoppel,
clear and convincing evidence is the majority view.72 In Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association, the court discussed the requirement of a distinct intent to prove a waiver or
68

Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, \ 14, 158 P.3d 1088.

69

28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver § 3; see generally 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel <& Waiver § 30.

70

28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver §30.

71

Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226,1230-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(although landlord did not initially
collect overdue rent and taxes, tenant was still obligated to pay the amount they contractually
agreed to pay).
72

Kelly v. Wallace, 972 P.2d 1117,1123 (Mont. 1998) ("Equitable estoppel is not favored an will
be sustained only upon clear and convincing evidence.") (citations omitted).
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an estoppel.73

Soter's, Inc. implies a clear and convincing standard subsumed under the

"distinct" requirement, albeit in dictum.74
The district court compounded the error of applying the wrong standard of proof by
confusing the requirements of waiver with those of estoppel The district court purported to
focus on detrimental reliance (required for estoppel, but not for waiver). However, the lack
of any evidence of reliance and factual disputes surrounding such reliance shows that the two
standards were in fact confused.
Waiver is not estoppel. Waiver is the knowing and intentional relinquishment of an
existing right The intent must be distinct75 While one's failing to enforce an executory
contract may amount to a waiver of the right to seek damages for past breaches, such
conduct does not terminate the future right to enforce the contract 76 Nor is the failure to
collect the "wrongdoing" of the collector so as to trigger an equitable right in the other party
to stop collection.77
Waivers cannot reach into the future and defeat executory contractual rights.
Estoppel can, but only upon a showing of reasonable detrimental reliance.78 A lessor's waiver
73

857 P.2d 935, 942 n.6 (Utah 1993).

74

Soter's Inc. }s requirement is consistent with the general rule that estoppel is a shield, not a
sword. Youngblood, 2007 UT 28 at \ 19; see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel <& Waiver § 31.

75

Soter's, Inc., 857 P.2d at 942.

76

"A party may re-establish a condition or obligation that had been eliminated by waiver in the
absence of an exchange of consideration or factors that support estoppel." J.K Hale Contracting
Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 585 (N.M. 1990).
77

Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Utah Ct App. 1988).

78

Id.; 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 259.
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of an escalation clause does not bar the lessor from prospectively enforcing it.79 In short,
waiver can bar exercise of a one-time right. Estoppel can bar enforcing an executory right.80
The "distinctly made" requirement mandates that waivers be express. An "implied"
waiver (a waiver through conduct or silence), being conceptually identical with estoppel,81
requires an independent reasonable belief leading to detrimental reliance. The relying party
must reasonably believe in the legitimacy of the other party's representations. A waiver
cannot create an estoppel; there must be, in addition to waiver conduct, an independent
wrongdoing of the waiving party on which the wronged party can reasonably rely. Objective
reasonability is required.82
B.

SLC Did Not Reasonably Detrimentally Rely on Big Ditch's
Diminishing Water Call.

79

Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1230-31 (landlord still entitled to collect overdue rent or taxes). Or, a
landlord may waive its right to prohibit a liquor store on its premises by idly standing by while
the store is built. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co. v. Wasilla, LLC, 182 P.3d 1131 (Alaska 2008). With
rent, the landlord is entitled to collect future rents, despite its past waiver. In the liquor store
example, once the store is built and the waiver happens, the store remains as a monument to the
landlord's inaction.
80

See 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 259. This is true whether a waiver is implied or
express. An effective implied waiver must be reasonably relied on by the nonwaiving party, and
is virtually identical with estoppel. Carr-Gottstein, 182 P.3d at 1139 & n.35. Carr-Gottstein, appears
to depart from the Utah requirement that a waiver must be distinct. Nevertheless, its discussion
focused on implied waiver, not express waiver, where distinctness becomes problematic in the
act and in the proof. It supports the suggestion made in Soter's Inc. that with the "distinct"
requirement, a clear and convincing burden of proof is appropriate.
81

28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver § 37.

82

Youngblood, 2007 UT 28 at ffi| 33-34.
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SLC argued below that Big Ditch's silence, or conduct, changed its contractual
obligations.

This implied waiver/estoppel argument therefore required an independent

reasonable belief leading to detrimental reliance, but SLC produced no such evidence.
The district court ruled that "virtually all of SLC's planning with respect to its water
resources, its changes in infrastructure and its dealings with others in trading irrigation rights
for culinary water rights have been predicated on the reduction in the amount of water taken
by Big Ditch." R. 6342. The district court made findings in reaching its decision, and those
findings (so large that the district court declared that they entirely accounted for the 100
years of City infrastructure) were largely inferred from a stunning paucity of evidence. On its
face, it is absurd to declare that the conduct of a single exchange partner, out of 32 others,
was the fulcrum on which turned a major city's development. Yet the statement is even
more remarkable given the record in this matter, which is bereft of any specific evidence
pinned to Big Ditch's conduct, and given the summary judgment standard, which requires all
inferences to be made in favor of the nonmoving party.
1.

SLC Alleged an Arcane Usage Pattern in Arguing Harm, Ignoring
That Big Ditch Wishes to File Change Applications, Not Return to
1905 Practices.

In Big Ditch's motion for summary judgment it accepted arguendo SLC's evidence of
reliance because that evidence was inadequate.83 The district court, in contrast, used the
evidence to resolve the matter for SLC. Even ignoring the already-addressed issue that the

83

This assumption was made only alternatively. R. 5402. Big Ditch raised a number of factual
disputes regarding the evidence's credibility and consistency in opposing SLC's motion. R. 5402,
5421.
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district court resolved factual disputes in reaching its result, SLC's evidence was inadequate.
SLC never showed it engaged in any reasonable reliance behavior.
Mr. Niermeyer's two affidavits were key to SLC's arguments. In his first affidavit he
argued that the 1905 contract had built into its language diminution based on restrictions on
nature and/or place of use. It stated that SLC made huge infrastructure improvements
based on SLC's "expectation and understanding of its obligations under the 1905
agreement."84 Being text-based, this affidavit contained no actual evidence of reasonable
detrimental reliance.
An incorrect understanding of the law or of an integrated contract is not the
representation of another party. Presumably, if diminution were the intent of the contract,
SLC would have had this belief from the day of signing, and therefore it could not have been
"induced" into such a belief by Big Ditch. Moreover, as a matter of law, there can be no
misunderstanding of an integrated writing; by definition it is unambiguous and amenable to

84

First Niermeyer Aff., Ex. E,fflj11,14. R. 349. In paragraph 11, SLC did not provide evidence
of reasonable detrimental reliance, but merely recited urbanization trends and claimed that Big
Ditch cannot take its full allotment of water at this time. SLC invoked restrictions on place and
nature of use as informing its understanding of its obligations under the agreement. Next, in
paragraph 14 the affidavit states that Big Ditch has gradually decreased its demand for irrigation
water, and that this decrease was consistent with SLC's understanding of its obligations under
the agreement. Not only is this irrelevant, but it does not constitute evidence of how SLC has
actually reasonably detrimentally relied on Big Ditch's conduct.
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only one construction.85 Furthermore, applicable law is incorporated into a contract, and as
such a misunderstanding of the law is no basis for detrimental reliance.86
After the district court rightfully rejected the arguments in the first affidavit, Mr.
Niermeyer submitted a second affidavit in which he abandoned the text argument. But, like
the first affidavit, the second affidavit embraces a theory that there are nature, place, and
amount restrictions on SLC's obligations, now arising from Big Ditch's conduct rather than
the contract text.
Mr. Niermeyer merely avers that if Big Ditch were to suddenly make 1905-era
requests for its water, delivered for irrigation in the historic Big Ditch service area, SLC
might struggle to deliver the water.

He fails to account for the event sparking the

lawsuit—Big Ditch's filing change applications for use of water in other places and for other
purposes. There is no evidence how the proposed change applications would harm SLC's
ability to take creek water, or would affect SLC's method of delivering water to Big Ditch.
SLC cited a litany of public works projects, but in doing so it continued to make its initial
error of theorizing an impact on its infrastructure in the face of a fanciful 1905-era request to
use all the water on the historical service area, and not from Big Ditch filing change
applications.

Moreover, it admitted it could not link any Big Ditch request with any

85

See Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, \ 12,182 P.3d 326; cf. Barnes, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). The district court ruled that the contract was integrated, a conclusion Big Ditch does not
dispute.
86

Reed p. Union Cent Life Ins, Co., 61 P. 21,21 (Utah 1900); 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver § 51.
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particular impact on or harm to City resources.87 At best, SLC was inviting the district court
to infer such harm, impermissible at summary judgment
Of course, most striking is SLC's failure to keep its story straight, as highlighted
above. Not only did conflict present an unresolvable factual dispute, but it showed that SLC
did not reasonably believe that Big Ditch was limited in its call. Three times Mr. Hooton so
stated. R. 5408-11, 5839-45, 5901-11. Mr. Hooton hopes for an adjudication to keep the
exchange companies from exercising their full contractual exchange rights. R. 5839. This
shows that SLC acknowledged its exchange obligations while investing millions in
infrastructure, and then denies those obligations by circularly citing to the infrastructure. Mr.
Hooton further admits that SLC believes it must deliver exchange water at full contract
levels.88 Though not generated by SLC, the many years of neutral commissioners' reports
representing to SLC that Big Ditch had a "Full Share Available" out of the Creek shows that
SLC had notice that its obligation continued.89

87

SLC never produced evidence of how Big Ditch's change applications could harm it. Utah
water policy encourages beneficial use as changes occur in populations. The final arbiter of
potential harm caused by a Big Ditch change application is the State Engineer. SLC has shown
no harm through past actions (which defeats SLC's estoppel claim), and can show no harm in
the future (because the change application process protects it from such harm). Moreover, SLC
has admitted it can deliver Big Ditch's full share of water. R. 5408-11, 5839-45, 5901-11, 6199.
Big Ditch also adduced evidence below that, by any account, SLC has a great surplus of water.
See, e.g. R. 473, 562, 6302.
88

R. 5842 Mr. Hooton echoed these thoughts at a symposium at which he was the keynote
speaker. R. 5901-12.

89

SLC produced no evidence below that it disavowed or otherwise objected to these reports.
R. 5499-5813.
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This evidence demonstrates that SLC merely formed a legal theory as to its
obligations, not based on any wrongdoing by Big Ditch, but by exercise of SLC's own legal
skill in interpreting the contract. It did not reasonably factually rely; it legally opined.
Estoppel does justice when a party makes an innocent factual misstep based on
deception by another.

A party that prepares legal contingency plans is not a deceived

innocent. SLC has always been able to deliver Big Ditch's full contractual share, and never
reasonably believed otherwise. A diminished delivery requirement was a possible outcome
SLC stated it wished to legally advocate. But a diminished call was not something on which
SLC could reasonably rely so as to equitably avoid the contract.
SLC also did not show how Big Ditch's diminished calls were a but-for cause of its
resource decisions. Estoppel requires that reliance be incompatible with the agreement as
written.90 The types of things SLC has done—develop infrastructure, forge agreements,
secure water rights—are things that cities normally do. None of this was inconsistent with
past, present or future full and complete performance of the 1905 agreement It is not
detrimentally reliant conduct.
SLC admitted that it could not cite to any single action it took in response to Big
Ditch's conduct R. 5311-12. Instead, it claims it acted as it did because all 32 of its exchange

0

"[C]onduct relied upon to establish estoppel must not otherwise be compatible with the
agreement as written." Am. Prescription Plan, Inc. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 170 A.D.2d 471,472
(N.Y.App. Div. 1991).
39

partners were reducing their calls. It cites no evidence as to how these other exchange
contracts would or could somehow act as an ensemble to increase SLC's burden.91
This ensemble argument made two erroneous assumptions. First, it improperly
attributed features of other contracts to the 1905 contract. Because some of those contracts
contained express limitations on nature or place of use, SLC assumed all exchange contracts
did. Apart from these provisions' violating public policy favoring maximal beneficial use of
water,92 this "everyone does it this way" argument led to a second erroneous assumption:
that every company might try, en masse, to not do it this way and restore their calls to historic

91

On the other hand, at least three of the cited exchange contracts do contain express restrictions
on nature and place of use. R. 5310, 5403-04. This validated the district court's early ruling that
no such restrictions existed in the Big Ditch contract, and vitiates the district court's later change
of heart. Furthermore, the mass call SLC fears is fiction. SLC has reduced its delivery
obligations to the 32 exchange partners over the last 50 years. SLC, for example, has adopted
a strategy in its watershed management plan to eliminate exchange contracts entirely, either by
acquiring shares or, more disturbingly, driving its exchange partners out of business. R. 4268-72,
4275, 6293-6323. SLC has been successfully implementing this plan. R. 4888-4930 (City buys
out Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch's right to transfer water from historic service area, which
reduced City's exchange obligation); R. 6294. See also R. 2595,2974, 3072-78, 3080,6294,6296,
6305,6302,499,501,503,4274-75,5840,6290,6322. Big Ditch requested that the district court
consider evidence of this conduct as part of a plenary record review connected with SLC's
motion for summary judgment on title, R. 4034, a requirement imposed by Rule 56(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court ignored these facts, either by striking the
Garside affidavit to which SLC-authored documents asserting the facts were attached, or by
essentially resolving them in SLC's favor and making inferences in favor of SLC, not Big Ditch.
92

See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5; see also EastJordan, 860 P.2d at 316 n.24; Syrett, 89 P.2d at 47576; Baird, 257 P. at 1065-66 (cited in East Jordan, 860 P.2d at 316 n.24). These cases reflect that
beneficial use of water should be made and continued. Likewise, SLC is equitably barred from
claiming that its contracting partner cannot beneficially use its water. Campbell v. Nunn, 2 P.2d
899, 901 (Utah 1931).
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levels.93

This argument ignored disparities among those contracts and made inferences

(inappropriate at summary judgment) as to whether such a call was now even possible.94
SLC could not show reasonable detrimental reliance. It admitted that it could deliver
Big Ditch's full contractual allotment. It admitted that rather than believing it had a
diminished obligation, it opined that it "should" have such a legal obligation. SLC cannot
invoke equity simply because it has embraced a legal position.
Even if the inconsistent Niermeyer and Hooton affidavits were credible, and SLC
could show nature and use restrictions prevented it from delivering the old levels of
exchange water, SLC could still show no impairment. If it is now difficult to deliver the
water required by the contract, the remedy is simple: don't deliver the water. The contract
allows SLC to make that choice, thereby removing any impairment. Of course, under this
scenario Big Ditch gets to exercise its reversionary rights under the contract, but this is what
SLC bargained for in the first place. In other words, there can be no prejudice if SLC no
longer has to comply with the contract. However, SLC cannot expect to both be excused
from the contract and keep the ongoing payments (creek water) required under the contract.

93

If SLC made these assumptions, did it ever intend to honor the agreement as written? The
Big Ditch contract was negotiated as it was despite being different from other contracts, and
with the knowledge that the full share was required to be available.
94

Among those inferences was the reasonability of SLC's reliance. Generally, the reasonability
of a belief is a fact question. Ilottv. Univ. of Utah, 2000 UT App 286, ^ 18. The district court did
not address the reasonability of SLC's belief, focusing instead exclusively on SLC's reliance.
Reasonability was implicit in the district court's finding of reliance and conclusion of estoppel.
The district court thus implicitly resolved factual disputes surrounding SLC's reasonability
(despite Big Ditch's arguments to the contrary).
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SLC's retooling argument, and therefore its alleged harm, presuppose 1905 place and
nature of use restrictions. These restrictions violate public policy. As already noted, an
implicit restriction in a water exchange contract on place or nature of use (absent
demonstrated impairment to an interested party) contravenes Utah law The opposite policy
controls. Beneficial use is the measure of water rights in Utah, and the freedom to use water
rights for different uses and in different places is the heart of that policy.
The importance of this public policy is magnified when applied to irrigation
companies. SLC used Big Ditch's status as an irrigation company to justify Big Ditch's death
through urbanization.

Irrigation companies, by their nature, must evolve to meet the

changing needs of their shareholders. Urbanization should not be, and is not, fatal to an
irrigation company.

Companies, through change applications, are able to allow their

shareholders to respond to development demands. Big Ditch, by filing change applications,
was simply preserving beneficial use through flexibly meeting development demand. SLC
asks of the 1905 contract: "How in the world can we deliver corn to your cows now that the
buggy roads are gone?" Big Ditch responds: "Use a semi and take it to the ethanol plant."
C.

The Exchange Contract Was Not Modified by the Parties' Conduct.

The district court had ruled previously, citing Tangren v. Tangren^ that the parties'
course of performance96 did not affect the interpretation of the contract, since the contract is
integrated. R. 3353. In its July 2009 ruling, the district court reversed itself, stating that the
parties' "historical conduct" showed that they modified the 1905 contract agreement to inject
95

2008 UT 20.

96

Or course of dealing (SLC intermixed the terms in the first instance).

42

into it a diminution component, irrespective of the statute of frauds requirement that
modifications be written.
The ruling violates Tangren. The parties' conduct in the performance of an integrated
agreement is irrelevant. The document's integration bars conduct evidence under the parol
evidence rule and the statute of frauds.

Yet the district court not only admitted this

evidence, but, as noted above, also ignored factual disputes concerning whether SLC was
entitled to rely on it. The district court relied on estoppel to bar Big Ditch from raising the
statute of frauds, the same estoppel used to bar Big Ditch from enforcing the contract as
written. In so doing the district court again resolved factual disputes and made inferences
adverse to Big Ditch.
To show a modification, SLC needed to avoid the statute of frauds. Under the
doctrine of partial performance, it had to show by clear and convincing evidence that Big
Ditch partially performed the modified agreement, and that SLC reasonably detrimentally
relied on that perfomance.97 In ruling for SLC, the district court articulated the wrong legal
standard. It raised estoppel as a defense to the statute. However, "estoppel" is not a defense
to the statute of frauds. The statute can be defeated only through a number of specifically
articulated and old common law defenses, among them partial performance.
The district court missed this point.

It created a new garden-variety estoppel

exception to the statute of frauds to avoid the strict requirements partial performance

'Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., 48 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah 1935).
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imposed. Its decision even goes so far to distinguish its new-found exception.98 The district
court erred. In its effort to create new law, it was citing language from a partial performance
case." Yet it jettisoned partial performance's requirement of exclusive referability.100 This
contrived standard was incorrect. Partial performance is the only viable exception to the
statute. Partial performance evidence must be strong, and be "acts-oriented rather than
word-oriented."101 Most important, those acts

must be "exclusively referable" to the

modified contract.102
SLC claimed that the contract was modified so as to reflect diminishing calls. While
SLC's acts of partial performance were, presumably, modifying its infrastructure, it admitted
that it had no evidence tying its allegedly reliant conduct to Big Ditch's actions, and further
admitted that it has always been able to deliver Big Ditch's full share of water.

SLC's

conduct is referable to its own prudent planning, not a modified contract.

98

Invoking "estoppel," the district court did wish to "delve into" partial performance. R. 6343.
The district court accepted Big Ditch's contention that the contract was covered by the statute
of frauds. Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 to 25-5-9; see, e.g., Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 44 P.3d 742
(overruled on other grounds by Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20,182 P.3d 326). The district court
focused on barring Big Ditch from enforcing the statute, not the statute's legal applicability.
99

That is, Bamberger Bamberger also recognized that it was operating within one of the
commonly-recognized exceptions to the statute. Bamberger, 48 P.2d at 491-92.
100

Ironically, even though the district court's new exception to the statute was legally fictitious,
SLC still failed to meet it. For the same reasons it failed to show estoppel to impose diminution,
SLC failed to demonstrate, with clear and convincing evidence, reasonable detrimental reliance.
101

Spears, 2002 UT 24 at \ 24.

102

Id.
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III.

T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MAKING VARIOUS EVIDENTIARY
A N D PROCEDURAL RULINGS.
The striking of the Christensen affidavits was error. He was Big Ditch's expert, and

his opinions directly related to Big Ditch's entitlement arguments in its fixed quantity and
tide motions. The district court's reasoning reveals its error: it merely stated that the record
was already large and that Mr. Christensen's affidavit would be "unnecessary and unhelpful,"
R. 4835, a direct and ambiguous quote from SLC's opposition to the affidavits. R. 4361.
The district court erred. It first purported to engage in an admissibility analysis, but cited no
rule supporting its conclusion. The affidavits were submitted in support of Big Ditch's
summary judgment motions and to rebut the City's affidavits. Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure requires denials of rule 56 motions based on multiple grounds to articulate
the grounds for denial. A fortiori this principle applies to striking documents in support of
Rule 56 motions.103 Relatedly, evidentiary rulings require citation to the evidentiary standard
that informed the district court's discretion.104
The district court also purported to engage in a timeliness analysis, stating that there
was no way to submit further affidavits once briefing had closed. This issue has not been
addressed by this Court since Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6 was amended. The rule once
allowed the filing of affidavits up to the day before the hearing.105 Big Ditch candidly
103

In its oppositions, SLC stated several grounds for relief. R. 3250, R. 4360.

104

Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires a definitive statement on the record
about why the evidence was excluded.
105

Until April 1, 2004, Rule 6(d) stated: "When a motion is support by affidavit, the affidavit
shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing
affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them
45

acknowledged the new rule's silence on timing, and invited the district court to clarify, yet
still admit the affidavit. R. 3186. Instead, the district court treated Big Ditch's candor as an
admission that there was no legal basis to allow the affidavits. This Court has now ruled that
it is not necessary to submit all supporting documentation together with the opening
memorandum, and this reasoning supports Big Ditch's approach below.106 The district court
erred.107
Big Ditch strongly objected to the final order prepared by SLC. The order eliminated
anything favorable to Big Ditch, expanded the district court's memorandum decision, and
sanitized inconsistencies in the district court's reasoning.

Most alarming was the order's

to be served at some other time."
106

Clegg v. Wasatch County, 2010 UT 5 at If 31.

107

Similarly, the Garside Affidavit, R. 481, was improperly excluded. The district court claimed
the affidavit was offered for antitrust, rather than the basis claimed by Big Ditch (lack of
impairment), R. 2945, and then used the erroneous basis to exclude it. Moreover, it only
partially excluded it, and did not articulate which part. SLC, in contrast to Big Ditch, succeeded
in getting in its key affidavits (those of Mr. Niermeyer), R. 2945, 6324, despite the fact that they
were largely argument, were legal conclusion, and lacked foundation. See Butterfield v. Okubo, 831
P.2d 97, 103 (Utah 1992)(expert affidavits have heightened foundational requirements).
Moreover, Mr. Niermeyer improperly relied on a summary of business records without making
available the originals, Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and
his summary was inadmissible because it was not kept in the ordinary course of business (it was
prepared solely for litigation). See Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft <& Co,, 622 P.2d 1168,1173-74 (Utah 1980).
The district court cited Mr. Niermeyer's" institutional knowledge" as foundation, even though
the affidavit cites "personal knowledge" and possession of City records for foundation. R. 34950. Wisely so, since there is no such thing as "institutional knowledge" as a foundational basis.
Rather, it arises in banking cases, e.g., United States Bank Nat'I Ass'n v. HMA, L.C, 2007 UT 40,
^| 12,169 P.3d 433; and fourth amendment cases, e.g., United States v. Adkins, 169 Fed. Appx. 961,
967 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006). Even if applicable, institutional knowledge requires active seeking of
information, Davis v. Dept. of Justice, 460 F.3d 92, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2006), not merely Mr.
Niermeyer's exercising "custody and control of SLC records" (he never once avers he reviewed
any of the records under his control).
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twisting of the memorandum decision's mandate: "the Court. . . does not decide the more
specific question of the precise amount of water which SLC is now obligated to deliver." R.
6344. By definition, imposing place and use restrictions defines Big Ditch's rights with a
precision the district court eschewed.
IV.
T H E DISTRICT COURT
ANTITRUST COUNTERCLAIM.

ERRED

IN

DISMISSING

BIG

DITCH'S

The district court acted on the wrong counterclaim when it dismissed the appellants'
antitrust counterclaim.

With respect to Big Ditch,108 there were substantial changes that

insulated it from the alleged weaknesses cited by the district court.109 Big Ditch sought
permission to file a second amended counterclaim to further address those alleged
weaknesses. It showed that SLC was an aggressive water market player far exceeding its role
as a supplier to its citizens. It alleged water "banking", "surplus" sales that annually generate
millions in revenue for SLC, and acquiring large numbers of water shares to control both
companies and water beyond its present or foreseeable needs. R. 1126. While abuse of
discretion is the standard of review for motions to amend, denying such motions is
disfavored,110 especially here where it is filed early in the litigation.111
108

The shareholders treat their counterclaims' dismissal in their brief, here incorporated by
reference.
109

The district court found that Big Ditch failed to allege that SLC competed with Big Ditch in
the same relevant marketplace, and that allegations of unilateral action were fatal to the antitrust
claims. The district court erred: Big Ditch demonstrated at length the specificity of its
allegations, R. 109-22, and also showed that unilateral conduct is sufficient to state a claim for
violation of the act. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-914(2) (2007).
110

Timm, 851 P.2d at 1183. Dismissing without leave to amend is highly disfavored.
Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); Ro/o v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 654 (3d Cir. 1998). Motions to
47

Apart from misconstruing antitrust law in assessing Big Ditch's counterclaims, the
district court also misapplied the exception that antitrust law creates for municipalities. The
Utah Antitrust Act does not apply to "the activities of a municipality to the extent authorized
or directed by state law."112 The exception applies only "when the anticompetitive conduct
alleged by the plaintiff 'is a foreseeable result' of a state's grant of authority in a particular
area." Id. It is not enough for the municipality to simply act pursuant to a statute.113
The district court ruled that SLC's water banking and surplus sales were a foreseeable
result of its compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14, which allows extraterritorial surplus
sales. Yet Big Ditch's allegations show that SLC's conduct goes far beyond the scope of the
statute, and is not a foreseeable result of it.114 The district court further erred by relying on
section 10-7-4(1) of the Utah Code, which allows municipalities to purchase water. This is
not a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state policy" to displace
competition.115

dismiss should not be granted without giving the losing party leave to amend. See Helfv. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 2009 UT 11, \ 15, 203 P.3d 962.
111

The second amended complaint was filed on March 4, 2008, very early in discovery and only
four months after the initial dismissal.

112

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-915(l)(f); see Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73,
f 14, 123 P.3d 437 (a party is only exempt if it is a "municipality" and its actions are also
"authorized or directed by state law").
113

W. If 41.

114

County Water Sys., Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah 1954).

115

Summit Water Distrib. Co., 2005 UT 73 atffij36, 45. Even if SLC's actions were "authorized
or directed by state law," SLC's actions would still not be exempt from the Utah Antitrust Act
because SLC is acting as a market participant, rather than as a "municipality." Id. at ^| 46 n. 10
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Finally, the district court erred because the "municipality exception" is an affirmative
defense, with the burden squarely on SLC, yet SLC submitted no evidence justifying the
application of this defense.116 The district court also failed to stricdy, and narrowly, construe
the law against SLC, as required.117
CONCLUSION
SLC wishes to restrict Big Ditch to 1905 uses. By doing so, it threatens Big Ditch's
very survival (SLC's ultimate goal). While SLC may argue that Big Ditch's death was written
into the contract, or that Big Ditch has invited death through its conduct, equity demands
otherwise.

Equity demands that if two parties enter into a mutually beneficial water

exchange, both parties should get their full benefit of the bargain. Big Ditch has perpetually
and continuously honored its agreement with SLC; equity demands the same of SLC.
This Court should confirm that Big Ditch's perpetual right to the use of water under
the 1905 contract is a water entidement sufficient to meet the requirements of section 73-33. Big Ditch should have access to the water transfer process. Further, both SLC and Big
Ditch mutually should be entided to their respective full fixed amounts under the exchange.
The district court should be reversed, with summary judgment being entered in favor
of Big Ditch's entitlement so it may file change applications on its water in the full
contractual amount contemplated by the contract's language. Its antitrust claims should also
be reinstated. Only this result can restore the rights Big Ditch bargained for 105 years ago.

116

See id. at Iff 47-48.

117

Id. at % 29.
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